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Towards a New Paradigm in Justifying 
Copyright: An Universalistic-
Transcendental Approach 
Christian G. Stallberg∗ 
 
In the modern digital age, copyright as an institution can no 
longer be taken for granted.  These days piracy of songs, movies, 
software and the like is hardly morally contested.  Indeed, it is not 
far-fetched to argue that piracy has become socially acceptable.  
But efforts to sanction such behavior are bound to fail.  Laws that a 
large majority views as untenable and refuses to comply with 
become normatively senseless.  For the acceptance of, and the 
compliance with, legal norms ultimately rests upon extralegal 
foundations, namely on the belief that these norms on the whole 
are morally reasonable.  Accordingly, only the development of a 
solid moral basis for copyright can strengthen its social acceptance, 
thereby warranting copyright’s future existence.  The arguments 
that have been offered do not provide such a basis.  Above all, they 
lack of sufficiently argumentative structures and a systematic 
framework from which a sound moral justification can emanate.  
The result is an increasing gap between a diminishing moral basis 
of and a growing disagreement over copyright. 
This Article attempts to provide a more systematic and rational 
basis for the moral justification of copyright.  First, the article 
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offers an analytical account of conceivable justification models. 
Rather than simply restating popular arguments, the author focuses 
on the implicit assumptions underlying these moral arguments.  
After elaborating two basic models of copyright justification, each 
of which can be subdivided into three subtypes, the article 
demonstrates that these models inevitably result in an 
irreconcilable divide between authors and society.  Secondly, the 
article therefore develops an alternative justification model that 
avoids this conflict.  This model stems from the idea that the one-
dimensional ground upon which usual arguments stand can be left 
by returning to the transcendental condition of their possibility, 
that is, human language.  Consequently, the article explains how 
intellectual works can be understood from the perspective of 
speech act theory.  On this view, intellectual works can be 
conceived of as complex speech acts.  The author elucidates how 
both a right of attribution of authorship as well as exploitation 
rights can be morally rooted in this finding.  The article concludes 
by highlighting the ontological and moral paradigm shift that 
occurs when the moral justification of copyright is conceived of in 
terms of communicative actions and their implied rules. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Copyright law, perhaps more than any other field of law, is 
subject to permanent struggle between opposing camps, each one 
arguing for and against legal reforms and changes in their own 
favor.  Admittedly, it may well be that this situation is simply 
rooted in the economic importance of copyright law.  Even 
marginal reforms of copyright law can affect producers, 
distributors, consumers, authors, and retailers in ways that 
significantly increase or decrease their expenses or revenues.  If 
one takes these economic reasons into account, the struggle for 
copyright law is unremarkable.  On the contrary, being a homo 
oeconomicus naturally necessitates a participation in that struggle.  
However, that is only half of the story and does not reveal a much 
more interesting feature worth highlighting.  It can be found in 
certain flaws embedded in the moral discourse on copyright itself.  
That is to say, many of the justificatory arguments being offered in 
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order to defend as well as criticize copyright lack clarity and an 
argumentative structure.  This is illustrated best by the popular 
strategy to employ personality and labor arguments in order to 
justify copyright.1  Those arguments are fully content with using 
rhetorical phrases and metaphors that merely aim at self-evident 
plausibility.2  That comes along with, and might be partly due to, 
an absence of coherent policy considerations held by the 
responsible legislative bodies.  Hardly surprisingly, such an 
uncritical environment invites participants primarily to define their 
interests, and only secondarily to look for arguments deserving 
their name. 
Hence, the intensity of the debate is not reflected in the quality 
of the arguments being made.  Still worse, there is an obvious gap 
between the ease with which those unconvincing arguments are 
steadily repeated and the growing disagreement over copyright 
law.  In the absence of defined structures and an argumentative 
framework, one cannot expect to find a solid normative basis for 
copyright.  Such a basis is required in order to maintain the 
fundamental aspects of copyright law.  For it is certain that 
copyright is not socially accepted in the same way other legal 
institutions are, e.g., private property in tangible goods.3  On the 
contrary, these days piracy of songs, movies, software and the like 
is hardly morally contested.  In the modern digital age, copyright 
as an institution can no longer be taken for granted.4  Indeed, it is 
not far-fetched to argue that piracy has become a socially accepted 
 
 1 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in 
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 285 (1970); 
Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1230 
(1996). 
 2 This is also emphasized in Katie Sykes, Towards a Public Justification of Copyright, 
61 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2003). 
 3 See Jeanne M. Logsdon et al., Software Piracy: Is It Related to Level of Moral 
Judgement?, 13 J. BUS. ETHICS 849, 855 (1994), for an empirical study showing that the 
development described is not bound to a low stage of moral development in the sense of 
Kohlberg—“the implications of our study are serious, since even those who are capable 
of the most principled moral reasoning may engage in copying behavior.” Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 4 The view that natural rights inherently accompany “intellectual production,” 
however, has long been held; for an early example see William E. Simonds, Natural 
Right of Property in Intellectual Production, 1 YALE L.J. 16, 16 (1891–1892). 
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activity, and efforts to sanction such behavior are doomed to fail.  
Laws that a large majority view as unacceptable and refuse to 
comply with ultimately become normatively senseless.  The 
acceptance of, and the compliance with, legal norms ultimately 
rests upon extralegal foundations, namely the belief that a certain 
norm complex on the whole is morally reasonable.  Obviously, this 
belief has been diminishing with regard to copyright law.  But 
why?  The answer lies ultimately in serious problems of the 
legitimacy of copyright.  These legitimacy problems can be 
subdivided into two categories, ontological and technological. 
Ontological problems stem from the ontology of intellectual 
works.5  Since these objects are not tangible but solely exist as 
intellectual constructs, it is much easier to criticize their legal 
status.  At least three such moral weaknesses of copyright attached 
to this ontology can be identified.6  The first may be called the 
problem of ubiquity.  Because of their intangible status, intellectual 
works can be used simultaneously in multiple ways.  The content 
of a book, for example, can easily be read, told, copied, and so 
forth by an unlimited number of people.  The question therefore 
arises as to why other people should be legally prevented from 
using a naturally unlimited good because of an artificial scarcity 
created by copyright law?7  Relatedly, there is a problem of greater 
restriction of individual liberty.8  Unlike property rights in 
 
 5 For further elucidation of the ontology of intellectual works see infra Part III.A. 
 6 Contrary to what A. M. Honoré, Social Justice, 8 MCGILL L.J. 77, 88 (1962) says, 
there is therefore a moral difference between intangible and tangible objects.  Also, it is 
equally misleading to suppose that the justification of copyright law is easier. See, e.g., 
Ernest Bruncken, The Philosophy of Copyright, 1916 THE MUSICAL Q. 477, 479 (1916) 
(stating the mistaken view that “[i]f . . . a man is, by the very nature of justice, entitled to 
have dominion over the product of either his hand or his brain, we must certainly admit 
that artists should have their copyright.”); see also Herbert Spencer, 2 THE PRINCIPLES OF 
ETHICS para. 305 (1893), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/files/334/ 
spencer_0155.02.pdf (“So that in fact a production of mental labor may be regarded as 
property in a fuller sense that may a product of bodily labor; since that which constitutes 
its value is exclusively created by the worker.”) (emphasis added). 
 7 See, e.g., Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
31, 34–35 (1989). 
 8 See, e.g., PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 211(Dartmouth 
1996); Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of 
Property Rights and Ideal Objects, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
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tangibles, copyright law restricts the individual liberty of people 
other than the copyright owner not only at a certain place, but also 
at every place.  This is logically the other side of ubiquity: if 
intellectual works can be used everywhere, then the exclusive 
protection of those works restricts people everywhere.  Finally, a 
problem concerning the notion of authorship arises.  Today it is a 
common occurrence that intellectual works never originate 
exclusively from the person authorship is attributed to.  Instead, 
every author is integrated into the manifold social and cultural 
contexts from which he steadily borrows.  Thus, creating 
intellectual works always means the appropriation of preceding 
ideas.  This point has been emphasized by the deconstructivism 
movement which focuses on deconstructing authorship and 
disclosing its ideological character.9  A similar view can be also 
found in the argument of private language advanced by 
Wittgenstein.10 
The legitimacy of copyright is also called into question by 
technological developments11 which have increased the awareness 
of the aforementioned ontological problems.  Indeed, the very 
historical reason for the emergence of copyright has begun turning 
against the institution.  In the same way the need for copyright was 
due to the invention of printing, nowadays its legitimacy is called 
 
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 43, 54–55, 76–79 (Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews 
eds., 2002). 
 9 See, e.g., Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, 
PRACTICE 113 (Donald F. Bouchard ed., 1977); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and 
Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 
1418–19 (1992); Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked 
Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 929–32 (1999); see generally Lionel Bently, 
Copyright and the Death of the Author in Literature and Law, 57 MOD. L. REV. 973 
(1994) (providing an overview); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in 
Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063 (2002–2003) (analyzing of the 
legal concepts of authorship). 
 10 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS para. 243–44 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans., Blackwell Pub. Ltd. 2d ed. 1958); see also Julian Friedland, Ideation 
and Appropriation: Wittgenstein on Intellectual Property, 12 LAW & CRITIQUE 185, 187 
(2001). 
 11 See also Sykes, supra note 2, at 10–11 (discussing these problems—though with a 
different terminology). 
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into question by different inventions.12  In particular, technological 
innovation has resulted in an increased quality and quantity in 
copying intellectual works.  The greater quality of copies is an 
effect of progressing digitalization.  In the digital world, every 
copy is not merely as perfect as the original; it even might be 
better.13  Between 0 and 1 as the binary code of the digital world, 
there is no longer space for what Benjamin once called the aura of 
art works.14  In the digital age, the concept of uniqueness no longer 
has any relevance.  In addition, copying can be done in greater 
quantity than ever before.  The main reason for this can be found in 
the emergence of the Internet which enables an incredible 
dissemination of intellectual works.  For every copyright owner the 
Internet seems to be a nightmare—it is a place “where the ability to 
copy could not be better, and where the protection of law could not 
be worse.”15  This does not mean that copyright cannot be enforced 
on the Internet.  Lessig has stressed that the Internet actually could 
be used in a manner allowing much more control over 
copyrights.16  As long as this does not happen, however, the threat 
is still there. 
Considering all of the above, the moral situation of copyright 
could hardly be worse.  In what follows, I shall provide some steps 
towards solving this situation.  I will generally attempt to reduce, 
or even partly eliminate, the lack of rationality in the discourse 
concerning the moral justification of copyright.  This enterprise 
consists of two parts.  First, I shall develop in Part II an 
argumentative and conceptual framework within which both 
proponents and opponents of copyright can articulate their moral 
arguments with more lucidity and precision.  This framework 
builds upon a differentiation and ideal reconstruction of 
 
 12 See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE 
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 21–24 (2003). 
 13 See NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 17–18 (1995) (“[A]rtifacts can be 
removed from the digital signal using a few extra bits and increasingly sophisticated 
error-correction techniques that are applied to one form of noise or another, in one 
medium or another.”). 
 14 See Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction 3–4 
(1935), available at http://design.wishiewashie.com/HT5/WalterBenjaminTheWorkof 
Art.pdf. 
 15 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 125 (1999). 
 16 See id. at 123. 
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conceivable models for justifying copyright.  Unlike in other 
articles,17 the account given herein will not simply rest upon a 
casuistry of arguments.  Instead, I will attempt to establish 
analytical distinctions between these arguments, through which 
logical relations and dependencies can be revealed.  This program 
might be designated as a moral conceptualization of copyright 
from the viewpoint of analytic philosophy.  Secondly, in Part III, I 
will outline an alternative model whereby the moral justification of 
copyright might be articulated in a different, more contemporary 
way.  By utilizing linguistic philosophy, my model focuses on the 
communicative feature of intellectual works.  This way overcomes 
problems and shortcomings of the other models. 
II. DIFFERENT MODELS OF JUSTIFYING COPYRIGHT 
In what follows I will develop or, more precisely, ideally 
reconstruct, different models for justifying copyright.18  For this 
 
 17 See, e.g., DRAHOS, supra note 8; William W. Fisher, Theories of Intellectual 
Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 173 
(Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, 
in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 129 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De 
Geest eds., 2000); William W. Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. 
L. REV 1661, 1695 (1988); Hettinger, supra note 7, at 31; Justin Hughes, The Philosophy 
of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, In Search 
of the Story: Narratives of Intellectual Property, 10 VA. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2005); H.M. 
Spector, An Outline of a Theory Justifying Intellectual and Industrial Property Rights, 8 
EIPR 270 (1989); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 1197 (1996); Samuel E. Trosow, The Illusive Search for Justificatory Theories: 
Copyright, Commodification and Capital, 16 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 217, 223 (2003); Lior 
Zemer, On the Value of Copyright Theory, I. P. Q., 2006, at 55. 
 18 These models necessarily presuppose (i) a concept of moral justification and (ii) an 
idea of how copyright may be its subject.  These issues cannot be addressed here in 
detail.  For reasons I have stated elsewhere, see CHRISTIAN GERO STALLBERG, 
URHEBERRECHT UND MORALISCHE RECHTFERTIGUNG 34–46 (Duncker & Humblot 2006), 
the former necessitates copyright’s positive correspondence to a moral norm; this 
correspondence might differ in level and scope.  As to its level, it can either concern 
copyright as an institution or as a specific content.  Its scope depends upon the deontic 
modus of the moral norm it corresponds to.  Thus, copyright is morally possible if it 
corresponds to a norm allowing the legislator its introduction.  In contrast, it is morally 
necessary if the norm requires the legislator to introduce it.  From an adequate meta-
ethical and methodological viewpoint, those aspects concern the legislative actions whose 
interpretative meaning is that norm or norm system establishing an exclusive legal 
relation between authors and certain intellectual works, i.e., what we term “copyright.” 
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purpose, it is useful to separate two distinct levels of analysis.  
These analytical levels enable one to structure both current and 
prospective discourses on the moral justification of copyright.  
Those levels provide crucial distinctions with which possible 
arguments can be both constructed and related to each other.  At a 
first level of analysis (Section A), it will be shown that all such 
models are based on a fundamental distinction, though they are 
often unaware of it.  This distinction results from the way in which 
all conceivable models of justification are connected or separated.  
This difference is not only of heuristic value; it has substantial 
implications for the type of copyright system that can be 
justified.19  Furthermore, this distinction has an additional impact 
that is of even more importance.  By analyzing the distinct 
relations it separates, this distinction enables, at a second level of 
analysis, to develop a typology of justification models as to 
copyright.  This typology comprises three justification models 
which I call individualistic (Section B) and three justification 
models which I refer to as collectivistic (Section C).  Having 
sketched the basic ideas of those models, I will subsequently 
present the general difficulties all of those models face (Section 
D). 
A. The Difference Between Individualistic and Collectivistic 
Copyright Models 
How might arguments justifying copyright be systematically 
ordered?  In the field of normative ethics, actions are usually 
evaluated in relation to two different aspects.20  On the one hand, 
the action as such, i.e., the intentions, reasons and motives of a 
human action, are focused on.  Accordingly, the intrinsic character 
of an action is involved in its ethical judgment.  A classical 
example of this doctrine is the moral theory of Kant.  His theory 
contends that the moral quality of an action depends solely upon 
the will of the agent.21  On the other hand, an action might be also 
 
 19 These consequences are mentioned infra note 35. 
 20 See, e.g., WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 13 (1963); Hugh LaFolette, Introduction, 
in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO ETHICAL THEORY 1, 6–11 (Hugh LaFolette ed., 2000). 
 21 For the classical statement, see IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 18 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) 
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morally evaluated by the social results it causes.  Hence, the 
extrinsic character of an action becomes the basis for its moral 
assessment.  This perspective is reflected in the doctrine of 
utilitarianism, according to which the morality of an action 
depends upon the overall happiness it produces.22  This conceptual 
distinction shows up under different labels; it is, inter alia, referred 
to as deontological/teleological, non-consequentialism/ 
consequentialism or non-utilitarian/utilitarian.  Not only does this 
distinction dominate moral philosophy; most of the moral 
justifications of copyright and intellectual property in general 
utilize it.  But seldom is it expressed by its common labels.23  
Rather, there is a confusing diversity of names which cannot be 
seen as a progress, neither in subject, nor in terminology.  It is 
expressed, for example, in notions like “The Author’s Right” and 
“The Instrumental Argument,”24 as well as “instrumental 
justification” and “desert justification.”25  An alternative 
terminology, which transports a mistaken conceptual view as well, 
distinguishes between economic and moral/natural law-
arguments.26  These arguments overlook that economy and 
morality do not mark an inevitable opposition, but, depending on 
 
(“It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that 
could be considered good without limitation except a good will.”) (emphasis added). 
 22 Classical formulations can be found in JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 11–16 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1996); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 411–17 (7th ed. 1907) 
(1874). 
 23 However, those common labels are used by Menell, supra note 17, at 129; Dale 
Nance, Foreword: Owning Ideas, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 763 (1990); Spector, 
supra note 17, at 270. 
 24 Lloyd Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 
1217, 1229 (1998). 
 25 Sterk, supra note 17, at 1197. 
 26 Such an approach can be found in Breyer, supra note 1, at 284; Jon Garon, 
Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy and Ethics, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1285 (2003); Alfred Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright 
as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 517 (1990); see also Shelley Warwick, Is 
Copyright Ethical? An Examination of the Theories, Laws and Practices Regarding the 
Private Ownership of Intellectual Work in the United States, BOSTON COLL. INTELL. 
PROP. & TECH. F. 060505, 3 (1999); Daniel Stengel, Intellectual Property in Philosophy, 
90 ARSP 20, 22 (2004). 
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the theoretical standpoint, can converge.27  By the same token, 
natural law and morals are not necessarily identical; instead, as 
contemporary theories show, morality can have a basis quite 
different from classical natural law doctrine.28 
To be sure, moral thinking in deontological and teleological 
categories is a simple and, at the same time, an intuitive method of 
evaluating human actions.  For the present purposes, however, we 
need a more specific distinction, that is, a distinction able to 
capture the ultimate difference between opposing justification 
models for copyright.29  Contrary to what the common distinction 
between deontological/teleological or consequentialistic/non-
consequentialistic models might suggest, the difference between 
the arguments justifying copyright does not lie in an intrinsic or 
extrinsic value of copyright.  Even though such considerations 
have their own right and are of some importance, they obscure the 
fact that, in the context of copyright, what matters is within which 
relation these considerations take place.30  For copyright’s intrinsic 
or extrinsic value ultimately hinges upon the particular relations 
from which it can be argumentatively derived.  These relations 
center around the subject matter of copyright protection, namely, 
intellectual works.  In other words, to whom do intellectual works 
 
 27 This position is often held by those adhering to the Economic Analysis of Law. See, 
e.g., Richard Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common 
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 487 (1980); for a more pragmatic reasoning, 
see, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 374 (1990); see also 
Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 
(1979). 
 28 Recent examples are Hobbesian interest theories of justice, Habermasian discourse 
ethics and Rawlsian justice as fairness. 
 29 That applies similarly for the conceptual distinction proprietarianism/ 
instrumentalism, introduced by DRAHOS, supra note 8, at 199.  Admittedly, he puts aside 
pure considerations in intrinsical/extrinsical categories; by the same token, however, he 
does not give way for a pure thinking in relations.  Instead, his distinction confines 
itself—since its rests upon contrasting Locke and utilitarianism—to separate natural law 
from legal privilege.  Yet it is rather interesting whose natural law or legal privilege it is 
about. 
 30 The same applies to the distinction between multilateral and bilateral public 
justification as utilized by Sykes, supra note 2, at 21.  This distinction misses the specific 
point when used in copyright contexts because it conceals the reason why these 
justifications are reasonable, i.e., the moral relation that tacitly is presupposed. 
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morally relate?  Thinking in relations replaces thinking in 
intrinsic/extrinsic values. 
In order to illuminate this concept, it is necessary to introduce 
the concept of primary and secondary relations.31  The primary 
relation refers to the moral relation which provides the arguments 
by means of which copyright is justified.  The legal relation, that is 
copyright, which exists between an author and an intellectual 
work, is morally derived from the primary relation and therefore 
termed a secondary relation.32  Both relations are logically 
independent from one another and, therefore, are not necessarily 
identical.  From this it follows that copyright, in the legal sense, is 
not necessarily the author’s right in the moral sense.  In the light of 
this basic difference, it is crucial to determine from which moral 
relation (primary relation) arguments are derived in order to justify 
the legal relation between the author and his work (secondary 
relation). Such primary relation can be morally constructed either 
between the author and his work, or between society and the 
work.33  As a result, copyright can be justified by arguments 
stemming from a moral relation between either author and work or 
society and work.34  Insofar as the first relation is chosen, I shall 
refer to an individualistic model of moral justification.  That is to 
say, the arguments by means of which copyright is justified are 
found and constructed within a primary author/work relation.  If 
the second relation is chosen and the society/work relation serves 
 
 31 These two different relations are somewhat confused in Carys Craig, Locke, Labour 
and Limiting the Author’s Right: A Warning Against a Lockean Approach to Copyright 
Law, 28 QUEENS’S L.J. 1, 6 (2002) (suggesting that the copyright interest must be 
understood as the consequence of the relationship between the public and the work). 
 32 See id. at 1 (creating a distinction between the legal relation between author and 
work and a different moral relation whereby it is justified). 
 33 Other relations, though equally conceivable, do not have any importance here.  (i) 
The author/society relation cannot be integrated, since that relation only reflects the 
relation in which the duties and obligations exist, not their reasons.  If the author has a 
moral right springing from his relation to his work, then he has such a right against 
society.  (ii) By the same token, the work/world relation is of no argumentative 
significance.  Since “world” in this context inevitably refers to the intellectual world, it is 
the equivalent of society because that is the place where meaning and communication is 
generated. 
 34 This framework is also employed by Craig, supra note 31, at 3–5, though with other 
terminology (“author-work link”/“public-work link”). 
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as the primary relation, I shall refer to a collectivistic model of 
moral justification.35 
The distinction between individualistic and collectivistic 
approaches must be clarified in two ways in order to avoid any 
misunderstanding.  First, the implied antagonism does not mean 
that collectivistic models ignore or underestimate the value of 
individuals.  Quite the contrary; social structures are usually 
desired because of their benefits for every individual.  This is the 
case, for instance, with claims that copyright is morally justified by 
the economic principle of efficiency.  Such an argument is by no 
means individualistic.  In moral terms, here the author only counts 
as an abstract individual, not as a specific being, namely an author.  
The author is integrated in a collectivistic justification just as any 
other member of society would be.  So the difference between 
individualistic and collectivistic models cannot be found in the 
exclusion or inclusion of individuals; it can only be found in the 
way in which individuals are morally included, that is, solely as 
authors, or other parts of society as well. 
A second aspect needs to be clarified.  I am not claiming that 
any argument can be definitely recognized as individualistic or 
collectivistic.  To be sure, in many cases it is hard to recognize 
whether a moral argument about copyright has an individualistic or 
collectivistic basis.  This is so because such arguments often rely 
upon rhetorical phrases without being aware of their theoretical 
basis.  The popular argument, for instance, that the author deserves 
his work as reward for his labor, is susceptible to either an 
individualistic or collectivistic interpretation.  On the one hand, it 
 
 35 The difference between individualistic and collectivistic models is not merely of 
heuristic importance, it concerns the justifiable content of copyright as well.  An 
argument based upon an individualistic model cannot justify the post mortal subsistence 
of copyright.  This can only be justified if a collectivistic model is employed.  This thesis 
rests upon two convincing assumptions: (i) Any argument claiming that human beings 
have mental states after their death, namely interests, is not accepted as a starting point of 
a contemporary rational justification; and (ii) Any individualistic model, however, leads 
to a post mortal copyright only if (i) is presupposed.  Unless leaving any rational 
discourse, therefore, one can only use a collectivistic model as rational foundation for 
post mortal copyright.  Since law serves interests of human beings, without a subject to 
be protected, there is nothing left for legal protection.  So if after the death of an author 
copyright is granted, it serves other interests than the author’s.  For an elaboration of this 
argument at full length, see STALLBERG, supra note 18, 50–52. 
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is conceivable that such a reward acknowledges an initial moral 
stake of the author in his work.  In such a case, the moral 
justification stems from the author/work relation.  On the other 
hand, that reward might be socially motivated by attempting to 
provide an incentive for creating works.  Then, reasons are 
involved concerning the society/work relation.  What kind of 
justification is being put forward—that is, which relation is the 
“primarily” primary relation—depends upon the ultimate reasoning 
behind it.  That reasoning does not appear in the rhetorical form or 
its perception.  Instead, the reasons upon which a justification of 
copyright ultimately is built show up in the case of conflict.  
Where an individualistic justification interferes with a collectivistic 
justification—e.g., if the protected works are socially invaluable—
its user must make a decision.  It is not before this decision that the 
priority of one of those perspectives and the moral reasoning of the 
argument is revealed. 
B. Three Types of Individualistic Justification Models 
Individualistic justification models represent arguments which 
claim a moral relation between author and work as a primary 
relation, by virtue of which a legal relation between author and 
work is justified as a secondary relation.  It is possible to show that 
individualistic models exhaustively appear in three different forms.  
These forms and their structures can be made explicit by an 
analysis of the primary relation between the author and the work.  
The intellectual starting point for this analytical operation is as 
follows: every individualistic justification—that is because it is 
individualistic!—always focuses on a characteristic quality within 
the author/work relation in order to construct an argument in favor 
of the author.  Consequently, there are exactly as many 
individualistic justifications as characteristic qualities within that 
primary relation.  It needs to be analyzed, therefore, what and how 
many characteristic qualities the primary relation author/work 
embodies. 
At the highest level of abstraction, the author/work relation 
embodies three characteristic qualities: (i) With regard to the 
author, it can be focused, first, on his properties, dependencies, 
intentions and so forth.  Then, one draws upon internal or external 
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characteristics which hinge upon the author as person—hence, the 
characteristic quality to be focused on is a person.  (ii) Second, it 
can be argued based on a mental or bodily activity of the author, 
for instance, when pointing toward his investment of labor in the 
work.  As a result an action of the author is chosen as the 
characteristic quality.  (iii) Regarding the work, third, the aspect of 
activity or action does not exist.  Instead, only perceivable aspects 
of the work itself can be used as arguments.  From an analytical 
point of view, therefore, three characteristic qualities to be 
argumentatively drawn upon exist within the author/work relation.  
These are the action, the person and the work of the author.  
Taking these preliminaries into account, three ways of justifying 
copyright can be distinguished, an Action-based, a Personality-
based and a Work-based Justification.  Each of those types and its 
theoretical forms will be briefly sketched.36 
1. The Action-based Justification of Copyright 
The Action-based justification generally claims that the action 
performed by an author while creating an intellectual work vests 
the author with a right in that work.  This justification can be made 
in two distinct ways, differing in how the author’s action involved 
is argumentatively used.37  On the one hand, the action might be 
conceived of as having a right-transferring effect.  In this case it 
operates as a kind of intermediary between a preceding right of the 
author and the right to be established in the created work.  Such an 
impact stems from a derivative use of the creative action.  As long 
as this route is taken, one has to contend that the author’s action 
possesses a formal property which enables it to extend the 
preexisting right to the created work.  On the other hand, the 
author’s creative action might be interpreted and conceived of as 
right-constituting.  Then it no longer extends a preceding right to 
the intellectual work but establishes such a right ab initio.  This 
line of argument is an original use of the creative action; it 
 
 36 For an analysis and discussion in detail see id. at 57–58. 
 37 On this analysis see further Christian Gero Stallberg, Ist das Urheberrecht das 
moralische Recht des Urhebers? Eine Kritik der populären Arbeits- und 
Persönlichkeitsrhetoriken als Rechtfertigungsbasis des Urheberrechts, ARCHIV FÜR 
URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT, Jan. 2007, at 109–12. 
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presupposes that the author’s action possesses a material quality of 
moral relevance.  On an abstract level, therefore, two types of 
arguments can be distinguished with which an Action-based 
justification might operate, a derivative-formal and an original-
material one.  The former is by far the most popular line of 
argument in copyright discourse.38  It is widely used and illustrated 
by referring to the so-called labor theory of property as developed 
by John Locke39 with whose entire theory it is often mistakenly 
equated.40  The latter approach is less frequently employed though 
it remains rhetorically a powerful one as well.41  However, it 
requires an elaborated account of a desert theory of justice which is 
rarely provided. 
2. The Personality-based Justification of Copyright 
A Personality-based justification presupposes a relationship of 
dependence between the authors’ personality and their intellectual 
works.  This relationship is legally protected and recognized by 
copyright.42  Depending on how and what kind of dependence is 
 
 38 For the Lockean approach—applied to copyright or intellectual property in general or 
to particular problems—see generally Craig, supra note 31; Benjamin G. Damstedt, 
Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 
1179 (2003); Steven J. Horowitz, Rethinking Lockean Copyright and Fair Use, 10 
DEAKIN L. REV. 209 (2005); Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-Based View of the 
Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 3 (2003); Adam D. 
Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65 (1997); 
Simonds, supra note 4; Spector, supra note 17; Lior Zemer, The Making of a New 
Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 891 (2005–2006). 
 39 See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT §§ 25–51 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1689). 
 40 This is so because Locke’s theory consists of four different arguments which 
concern, on the one hand, the justification of private property as such and, on the other 
hand, the modalities of its acquisition.  The Lockean argument representing the 
derivative-formal type merely addresses one of those aspects, namely how private 
property can be acquired.  Consequently, labeling this argument as Lockean justification 
is somewhat inaccurate.  For only a small portion of Locke’s theory is used whose 
normative subject matter is fairly extended. 
 41 See generally Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 609 (1993); Hughes, supra note 17, at 300. 
 42 It has to be emphasized, therefore, that the metaphorical image of an imprint of the 
author’s personality upon his work is argumentatively not a Personality-based, but an 
Action-based Justification.  For in this popular account, the author’s personality does play 
a role only insofar as it has been integrated into the work.  By invoking the powerful idea 
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constructed, two types of Personality-based justifications have to 
be distinguished.  The development-theoretical type assumes that 
copyright is necessary in order to warrant the author’s 
development as a person.  By considering personhood as a 
necessary condition of human autonomy, this type leads—given 
the premise of a moral right to freedom—to the conclusion that 
granting copyright to authors is morally necessary.  In contrast, the 
identification-theoretical type starts with the assumption that 
creating a work results in a psychological relation between the 
author and the work.  In other words, the intellectual work is part 
of the author’s personality and should be considered an integral 
part of his own identity.  In order to prevent harmful interferences 
with the author’s identity or to avoid the creation of psychological 
pathologies, this relation needs to be protected by legal means, i.e., 
by copyright.  Thus it can be seen that both types, though in 
different ways, are based on the same normative tenet, namely the 
freedom of individuals.  Whereas the former strand of argument 
plainly relies upon a metaphysical conception of person, the latter 
is of more empirical character.  The development-theoretical type 
is usually derived from and associated with Hegel’s theory of 
property as developed in his Philosophy of Right.43  The 
identification-theoretical type has no well-established theoretical 
background which may be the reason why it is rarely put 
forward.44 
 
of a right-transferring activity, therefore, the derivative-formal mode of an Action-based 
justification is employed. 
 43 See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT paras. 41–71 (T.M. 
Knox trans, Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1821). 
 44 Discussion of this model can be found solely in Becker, supra note 41, at 626–28 
(classifying this idea, strangely, as labor-based justification by desert); see also 
LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 49 (Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 1977).  The mentioned psychological relation is loosely indicated in Linda J. 
Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1539, 1541–42; Neil 
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author 
Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 400–02 (1993); Sterk, supra 
note 17, 1239–44.  As general justification of property the idea is suggested by Margaret 
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959–61 (1982). 
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3. The Work-based Justification of Copyright 
The Work-based justification also assumes a certain kind of 
dependency between authors and their intellectual works.  Yet this 
relationship differs in two respects from the Personality-based 
justification.  First, it no longer stems from a metaphysical or 
psychological ground but from the specific ontology of intellectual 
works, namely their immaterial nature.  Secondly, the intellectual 
work depends upon the author, rather than the author being 
dependent on the work.  So copyright is seen as a moral 
consequence of this dependency.  This sort of dependency might 
be construed in at least two distinct ways.  The communicative-
theoretical type emphasizes the communicative aspect of 
intellectual works.  It starts with the premise that authors 
communicate their thoughts to the public through intellectual 
works.  It further supposes that the content of an intellectual work 
can only be communicated authentically if the attribution to its 
author remains intact.  Put differently: the intellectual 
appropriation of a work is possible solely with hermeneutical 
recourse to its author.  Therefore, a legal regulation is needed to 
protect this functional condition of communication and to avoid a 
violation of the authors’ communicative freedom.  The idea 
underlying this argumentation can be traced back to Kant’s theory 
of authorship where it finds its most prominent manifestation.45  
The exclusive-theoretical type takes a different route by 
constructing a dependency based not on a condition but on a limit 
of intellectual appropriation.  According to this view, an 
intellectual work is by its very nature exclusive: it necessarily 
precludes people other than the author from its entire 
appropriation.  It is merely the author’s mind which has access to 
the full intellectual meaning of the work, i.e., its specific form of 
thought.  Copyright, then, is simply a normative recognition of 
what already exists, namely the exclusive relationship between the 
author and his work.  Such a justification can be derived from 
 
 45 Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books, in 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 29, 29–35 (Mary J. Gregor trans., 1996) (1785); see also 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 106 (Mary J. Gregor trans., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1991) (1797). 
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thoughts developed by Fichte on the wrongfulness of book 
reprinting.46 
C. Three Types of Collectivistic Justification Models 
Unlike individualistic models, collectivistic models47 do not 
claim a moral relation between author and work.  Instead, these 
models construct a moral relation between society and work.  This 
primary relation serves as a moral basis on which a legal relation 
between author and work is justified as a secondary relation.  By 
utilizing collectivistic justifications, the separation of the legal 
right from its moral basis—suggested by introducing the 
distinction between primary/secondary relations—is not merely 
analytically but also argumentatively maintained.  That is to say, 
the legal and moral congruency strongly emphasized by the 
individualistic justification models is rejected.  Copyright as legal 
right of the author is no longer conceptualized as his moral right 
but as a means to accomplish social goals.  Each collectivistic 
model refers to a social goal that is considered desirable, whose 
development, stabilization, or achievement is allegedly being 
promoted by copyright.  As a result, collectivistic models normally 
show up in the form of consequentialism, i.e., they take into 
consideration the social consequences of copyright.48  They differ 
only in what goal they regard as socially desirable.  As a result, 
every collectivistic justification inevitably relies upon a certain 
normative conception of society.  Since such conceptions are 
theoretically limitless, providing an analytical typology of 
collectivistic justifications is difficult.  Nevertheless, their diversity 
can be put in order.  All collectivistic models structurally differ in 
 
 46 See Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Beweis der Unrechtmässigkeit des Büchernachdrucks, in 
I GESAMTAUSGABE DER BAYERISCHEN AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN 409 (Rüdiger 
Lauth ed., 1964). 
 47 In the literature, several distinct terms can be found describing the same doctrine. 
See, e.g., Sykes, supra note 2, at 23 (“social policy arguments”). 
 48 For that reason, collectivistic justifications are often termed “utilitarian.”  In so 
doing, however, the concept of utilitarianism is by far exceeded.  For it is used then to 
generally describe a program according to which the moral value of a regulation comes 
along with its social benefit.  The specific idea of utilitarianism, though—greatest 
happiness of the greatest number—is thereby missed.  It is reflected, more or less, solely 
in the Efficiency-based justification as it is sketched in supra Part II.C.2. 
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how weak or strong the normative premises are that their 
normative conception of society entails.  This determines which 
social function intellectual works are associated with, i.e., what 
human needs and goals they are deemed to serve.49 
I shall differentiate between three distinct ways in which a 
normative conception of society may define how its members 
ought to live.50  What is important is whether those conceptions are 
merely negative, i.e., setting up minimum boundaries of satisfying 
needs, or whether they are positive, i.e., demand the maximum 
satisfaction of any need or the satisfaction of certain needs.  (1) In 
an economic conception of society, it is up to the people to decide 
which needs to satisfy and which goals to pursue.  This conception 
only posits that those factual needs and goals should be satisfied in 
a way leading to the maximum overall satisfaction of all society 
members.  (2) In contrast to the previous conception, by at least 
partly deciding what needs and goals are to be pursued, a cultural 
conception of society values some needs and goals higher than 
others.51  Such a conception consequently integrates not only 
factual, but also assumes normative, needs and goals.  (3) Finally, 
a negative conception of society takes a position between 
integrating factual and/or normative needs.  It abstains entirely 
from demanding either the maximum satisfaction of factually 
chosen needs and goals or the satisfaction of certain normative 
needs and goals.  Instead, it posits that if any human needs or goals 
are being satisfied or pursued, some minimum constraints should 
be respected.  Having introduced three normative conceptions of 
society, we can distinguish three types of collectivistic 
 
 49 Probably the most well-known example for an existing collectivistic justification 
reflects the U.S. Contitution, which reads “Congress shall have power . . . [t]o promote 
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  This implies the opinion according to which copyright’s moral basis can 
be found in its promotion of social goals; here, progress in science and useful arts. 
 50 Such theories are commonly referred to as theories of the good (life), the term 
Aristotle used in Nicomachean Ethics and other works. 
 51 This conception also comprises arguments attempting to guarantee merely the 
freedom of people, for such a conception normatively presupposes a need for liberty, 
whereas the economic conception theoretically can be utilized for a need for restriction of 
liberty.  This is overlooked by RONALD DWORKIN, Can a Liberal State Support Art?, in A 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 221, 229–33 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 1985). 
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justifications as well, namely a Constraints-based model, an 
Efficiency-based model and a Culture-based model.52  These 
justifications answer in a different manner why intellectual works 
are needed in society. 
1. The Constraints-based Justification of Copyright 
The Constraints-based justification stems from a negative 
conception of society.  According to this approach, copyright is not 
justified because it positively promotes the achievement of a 
certain ideal of society.  This model merely holds a neutral relation 
between society and intellectual works, without attributing any 
specific need to intellectual works.  Rather, copyright is justified 
because its existence does not entail any negative consequences for 
society.  From that, it follows that the moral foundation of 
copyright can be traced back to universal constraints of society; by 
not violating these constraints, its existence cannot be morally 
objectionable.  Since copyright, it is argued, abides by these 
minimum constraints which govern human action, its legal 
implementation is permissible, i.e., morally possible.53  In this 
view, copyright is not the result of a constituting, but of a 
constraining, principle which is inherent in any reasonable 
conception of society.  Now, what kind of principle constraining 
human action might be generally agreed upon?  At this point, it is 
quite common to utilize a part of Locke’s property theory.54  This 
theory contains the idea of an appropriation limit which can be 
found in the so-called sufficiency-proviso.55  According to the 
proviso, an appropriation of things is permissible insofar as there is 
“enough, and as good left”56 for others.  This proviso, then, is 
employed to render copyright morally acceptable.57  Needless to 
 
 52 For a detailed discussion of these models, see STALLBERG, supra note 18, at 205. 
 53 This clearly shows that a Constraints-based Justification leads to a weak justification 
of copyright.  For if its implementation is merely morally possible, one may just as well 
abstain from implementing it.  The impact of such an approach confines itself to provide 
moral information whether copyright, when existing, is permissible or not. 
 54 LOCKE, supra note 39, §§ 25–51. 
 55 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 175–182 (1974). 
 56 LOCKE, supra note 39, §§ 27, 33. 
 57 See, e.g., ADAM D. MOORE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INFORMATION CONTROL: 
PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 6–8, 71–119 (2001); Adam D. 
STALLBERG_121307_FINAL 12/13/2007  10:02:14 PM 
2008] TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM IN JUSTIFYING COPYRIGHT 353 
say, the Lockean proviso is, more or less, only a particular example 
of the more general principle of neminem laedere (no-harm 
principle) that can already be found in Roman law.58 
2. The Efficiency-based Justification of Copyright 
The Efficiency-based justification is arguably the most popular 
variant of a collectivistic justification of copyright.59  
Notwithstanding differences in detail, one may well summarize 
this model in the idea that copyright “can be explained as a means 
for promoting efficient allocation of resources.”60  Consequently, 
copyright is conceived of as a means to achieve an economically 
efficient production and use of the intellectual works it protects.61  
To be sure, this thesis needs to be supplemented in order to 
become a justification of copyright.  Besides demonstrating the 
economic rationality of copyright, this finding must also have a 
moral dimension.  The starting point of this model is the basic 
problem of economics.  Given scarce resources and infinite human 
 
Moore, Toward a Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
MORAL, LEGAL, AND INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS 81–103 (Adam D. Moore ed., 1997); 
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the 
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); Adam D. Moore, A 
Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 77–108 (1997). 
 58 See JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 1.1, at 36–37 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans., 
Cornell Univ. Press 1987). 
 59 The number of articles dealing with this approach is permanently increasing; for 
examples, see the bibliography in Wendy J. Gordon & Robert G. Bone, Copyright, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, CIVIL LAW AND ECONOMICS 189, 204–15 
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).  In addition to numerous articles, 
there are also some books devoted to this program; see in particular WENDY J. GORDON & 
RICHARD WATT, THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND 
ANALYSIS (2003); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2003); RUTH TOWSE, CREATIVITY, INCENTIVE 
AND REWARD: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COPYRIGHT AND CULTURE IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE (2001); RICHARD WATT, COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY: FRIENDS 
OR FOES? (2000). 
 60 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyight Law, 
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 325 (1989) (emphasis added). 
 61 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 
283, 308 (1996), separates these aspects.  Depending on whether the production or the 
use of intellectual works is the focus, Netanel distinguishes an incentive approach and a 
neoclassicist approach. See id.  In this Article, however, both aspects are equally referred 
to as Efficiency-based Justification. See id. 
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needs, distribution conflicts inevitably arise.  In order to reduce 
those conflicts, resources have to be used in a way that achieves a 
maximum of satisfaction (allocation efficiency).62  This is 
theoretically ensured by the market mechanism.  With regard to 
copyright, however, a market failure is assumed.  That is to say, 
despite the demand for intellectual works, the market does not 
provide their sufficient production and distribution.  The reason is 
the free-riding problem of public goods.  Since access to 
intellectual works is difficult to control, people might hope to use 
them free of charge.  As a result, consumer demand does not 
reflect the real value of intellectual works.  Guided by incorrect 
market signals, intellectual works are underproduced and/or under-
distributed.  Given this situation, the market mechanism 
misallocates resources.  Copyright, it is argued, rectifies this 
market failure.  By creating an artificial scarcity through an 
exclusive legal right, intellectual works become commodified 
products.  For this reason, a monetary incentive encouraging the 
sufficient production and distribution of intellectual works is 
necessary.  Moreover, it is assumed that copyright is the most 
efficient means able to rectify this market failure. 
3. The Culture-based Justification of Copyright 
A Culture-based justification is based on a specific cultural 
conception of society.  Here, intellectual works are endowed with a 
special meaning for human well-being; they are considered 
indispensable for a culturally valuable society.  If this culture is 
desirable, then the need for intellectual works is also desirable.  
Given that copyright is required as an incentive for the production 
of intellectual works, copyright becomes a necessary condition of 
that culture.  In this way, the moral basis for copyright shifts to 
stronger normative premises.  It no longer stems from a conception 
of society that requires the most efficient satisfaction of contingent 
needs.  Similarly, minimum constraints of human striving are 
irrelevant.  Rather, certain needs considered valuable are invoked 
 
 62 See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 249 (14th ed. 
1992). 
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for the justification of copyright.  There are a number of ways63 in 
which it may be asserted that a lack of intellectual works results in 
a “state of cultural stasis.”64  The most popular contemporary way 
is the recourse to political culture, namely to democracy.  In its 
rudimentary form, this approach is indicated in the idea of 
copyright as “engine of free expression.”65  Its systematical 
elaboration can be found in articles written by Neil Netanel, who 
attempts to justify copyright by supposing a necessary connection 
between democracy and copyright.66  This does not mean, as one 
might be tempted to think, that copyright is considered the 
necessary outcome of a democratic process.  Instead, Netanel 
argues that copyright is a necessary condition of democracy.  Thus, 
copyright is not conceptualized as a restriction of free expression67 
but as its enabling constituent.68  In other words, democracy 
depends upon certain flows of communication generated by 
copyright in the first place.  By connecting this idea with the need 
for a democratic society, a moral justification is put forward 
distinct of an efficiency perspective. 
D. The Problem of Irreconcilability 
Now that I have given an account of those justification models 
which are widely used, albeit not in the structured and ideal form 
presented here, I will turn to their critique.  Since I cannot 
specifically address here the internal and external flaws of each of 
these models,69 I will confine myself to a discussion of the general 
 
 63 See, e.g., Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, supra note 17, at 192 (explaining 
that the potential possibilities are endless). 
 64 Barbara Friedman, From Deontology to Dialogue: The Cultural Consequences of 
Copyright, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157, 158 (1994). 
 65 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
 66 See Netanel, supra note 61; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s 
Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217 (1998); Neil 
Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 1879 (2000).  For a critique on Netanel’s views on copyright and 
democracy, see Christopher Yoo, Copyright and Democracy: A Cautionary Note, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2000). 
 67 See, e.g., Donald Diefenbach, The Constitutional and Moral Justifications for 
Copyright, 8 PUB. AFF. Q. 225, 230–34 (1994). 
 68 Netanel, supra note 44, at 226 n.27. 
 69 Such a critique can be found in STALLBERG, supra note 18, at 200, 296. 
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problem they all face.  This problem is a serious and crucial one, 
though often overlooked.  It is implicitly embodied in the basic 
distinction between individualistic and collectivistic models I 
developed above.  Those people who argue in favor of copyright 
find themselves in a situation we may call the problem of 
irreconcilability.  That is to say, the different moral perspectives 
on copyright expressed by the distinction between individualistic 
and collectivistic models cannot be reconciled in case of conflict.70  
On the contrary, they ultimately make a decision between the 
author and society inevitable.  To be sure, in such a situation it is 
quite popular to seek relief by simply compromising or balancing 
the interests involved.  However, such an attempt is bound to fail 
as long as the models are taken seriously, that is, as long as they 
are consistently treated as models of moral justification.  This point 
will become clear after elucidating different propositions that a 
moral justification of copyright might state. 
The proposition made by a moral justification of copyright can 
vary in two different aspects, namely in its level and its scope.  Its 
level determines whether a normative proposition applies to either 
copyright as an institution or copyright as a content.71  The 
institutional level concerns whether the copyright system is 
generally justified, independent of its substantive implications. The 
content level depends logically upon affirming the prior 
institutional level.  It deals with the question of how the copyright 
system ought to be shaped: under what circumstances what 
particular rights are to be granted.  Either level can show up with a 
different scope of justification, depending upon the deontic modus 
the normative standard they correspond to has.  The weakest kind 
of justification is one according to which copyright (“C”) 
corresponds to a moral norm, allowing the legislator to legally 
introduce it.  Then C is merely morally possible.  In contrast, the 
strongest justification is where the norm commands the legislative 
 
 70 To be sure, as far as there is no conflict between certain individualistic and 
collectivistic models, the problem of irreconcilability does not appear.  However, this is 
very rarely the case. 
 71 In this context, speaking of copyright as an institution merely refers to its abstract 
being as a norm complex, whereas speaking of copyright as a content refers to its 
concrete implementation. 
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bodies to legally introduce the copyright system.  In this case C is 
morally necessary. Regarding the institutional justification level, 
one of those deontic modi must be given if C is to be justified.  The 
situation changes when considering the content level.  For 
example, it is possible that particular rules are forbidden.  Thus, it 
is conceivable that a moral norm commands the legislator to 
institutionally introduce C, and at the same time forbids the 
particular content C1. In this case, C is either morally possible or 
necessary, but its implementation C1 is morally impossible.  
Depending on the modus of the norm, the legislator has to, or is 
allowed to, set up copyright.  However, he is not allowed to choose 
C1 but has to choose different implementations like C2–Cn. 
Depending on whether the institution or content of copyright is 
allowed, prohibited or even required, one can distinguish between 
the moral possibility, moral impossibility and moral necessity of 
copyright.  In most cases,72 justification models do not merely 
claim the moral possibility but even the moral necessity of 
copyright.  This is explicitly or implicitly presupposed or 
expressed by the justification of a concrete copyright system.  The 
distinctions drawn here enable us to consider in what respect 
compromising or balancing of interests is inadequate.  If, for 
example, according to an asserted moral norm (N1), an unlimited 
subsistence of copyright is morally necessary (C1), whereas, 
according to another asserted moral norm (N2), copyright’s 
expiration with the death of the author is morally necessary (C2), 
then there is an insolvable conflict.  For that conflict cannot be 
settled by way of compromising, e.g., by determining expiration of 
copyright 70 years after the death of the author.  On the contrary, 
such an outcome would be morally impossible according to N1 and 
N2.  Cleary then, C1 and C2 by no means can be compromised.  A 
more fundamental objection supports this view: there is no need 
for any balancing of N1 and N2 because there is no normative 
conflict at all.  This can be seen when thinking of conflicting 
norms in general.  Is it necessary or possible in such a situation to 
balance norms against one another?  No, for it is absolutely 
 
 72 The only exception is the model, which I refer to as Constraints-based model. 
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impossible that some valid norms contradict each other.73  Such a 
norm contradiction would not be compatible with the very concept 
of normative validity; this concept implies that contradicting norms 
cannot be valid at the same time.  Thus, in such cases we do not 
face a contradiction of norms, but of norm formulations.74  In other 
words, we are talking of a semantic, not of a normative 
contradiction of N1 and N2.  On this semantic level it must be 
already clarified which norm formulation prevails and which norm 
is therefore taken as being valid.75 
III. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: THE UNIVERSALISTIC-
TRANSCENDENTAL APPROACH 
In this section, I will present an alternative argument whereby 
the shortcomings of both individualistic and collectivistic models 
of justifying copyright are partly reduced, if not eliminated.  The 
suggested argument relies on the insight that the intangible being 
of intellectual works is not only their ontological but also their 
moral particularity.  The ubiquity of intellectual works, in other 
words, must not be classified and interpreted as moral weakness—
as is commonly believed76—but, if anything, as their moral 
strength, i.e., the reason for the legitimacy of copyright.  This 
thesis is drawn from the fact that justification models which 
originally apply to tangible objects cannot successfully attempt to 
justify what is, compared with these objects, morally questionable. 
The moral flaws copyright is usually confronted with cannot be 
removed by simply ignoring these differences.  If copyright ought 
to exist at all, the intangible character of intellectual works has to 
 
 73 This view is pointed out very well by HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 74–81, 
206 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed. Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1960). 
 74 On the distinction between norm and norm formulation see GEORG HENRIK VON 
WRIGHT, NORM AND ACTION: A LOGICAL ENQUIRY 93 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1963). 
 75 This does not apply to value judgments: they need to be balanced against and 
compromised with other conflicting values since they do not inform us about their 
relation to other values.  Obligation judgments, however, do not represent normative 
statements to be balanced against others, but are already the result of compromised 
values. 
 76 See supra Part I. 
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be recognized and acknowledged as the key to its moral 
justification. 
Every moral justification of copyright needs to take both the 
rationality of individualistic and collectivistic models into account.  
A simple combination of those models, however, hardly achieves 
that objective.  If that were the case then the question of which 
primary moral relation prevails in the case of conflict with the 
other would be left unanswered.  This clearly shows that every 
attempt to reconcile those models by a balancing of interest 
inevitably fails.  If an individualistic model holds it as morally 
necessary to implement a right of life long duration in favor of the 
author and a collectivistic model considers it morally impossible, 
obviously this contradiction cannot be logically resolved.  On the 
contrary, those models have to be kept separate in order to disclose 
the crucial difference one must decide upon; that is, namely 
whether to favor the author or society.  What we need is a more 
fundamental approach whereby both perspectives are, as it were, 
deconstructed and freed from their fierce opposition.  I will 
subsequently refer to this approach as a universalistic-
transcendental justification.  This term means that the proposed 
model is neither individualistic nor collectivistic; rather, it can be 
conceived as a condition of the possibility of either relation.77  
Now the ultimate precondition enabling these relations, i.e., the 
prerequisite of the difference they imply, can be found in the 
human language. 
Thus, the alternative model that will be sketched in this Article 
finds its roots in linguistic philosophy.  That is to say, conventional 
linguistic rules are used to demonstrate the moral plausibility of 
copyright.  Roughly speaking, this alternative model is built upon 
two theoretical ideas.  The first idea consists of the assumption that 
the performance of human language is a rule-orientated action.  
 
 77 See generally C. D. BROAD, KANT. AN INTRODUCTION 13–15 (C. Lewy ed., 1978) 
(explaining Kant’s concept of transcendental arguments); SEBASTIAN GARDNER, KANT 
AND THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 188–96. (Tim Crane & Jonathan Wolff eds., 
Routledge 1999). 
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Stemming from the late Wittgenstein,78 this idea has been 
elaborated systematically by the speech act theory as developed by 
Austin79 and Searle.80  The second idea refers to the assumption 
that those linguistic rules have moral implications as well.  Though 
more or less already included in the theory of speech acts, that 
conclusion was drawn first by the theory of discourse ethics as 
developed by Apel,81 Habermas,82 and Alexy.83  Hence, the 
following discussion might be conceived of as an attempt to 
morally reconstruct copyright by means of speech act theory.  
Subsequently, I shall term this program the linguistically moral 
reconstruction of copyright.  Clearly, the complete elaboration of it 
would be an undertaking needing a separate monograph.  
Therefore, this Article is restricted in two ways, both in its 
theoretical scope and its subject matter.  As to its theoretical scope, 
only the speech act theory originally developed by Searle is 
employed, notwithstanding different versions, alterations or even 
criticisms of that theory.  Moreover, this theory will be applied 
only to a small extract of what can be seen as intellectual works.  
The purpose of this paper is not to provide a complete account but 
to outline an alternative argument that lies beyond the conflict 
between individualistic and collectivistic justifications of 
copyright. 
 
 78 See, e.g., WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 10, para. 23 (“Here the term ‘language-game’ is 
meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an 
activity, or of a form of life.”). 
 79 See generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina 
Sbisà eds., Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 1981) (1962). 
 80 See generally  JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LANGUAGE (2d. ed. Press Syndicate of the Univ. of Cambridge 1984) (1969) [hereinafter 
SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS]. 
 81 See KARL-OTTO APEL, The A Priori of the Communication Community and the 
Foundations of Ethics: The Problem of a Rational Foundation of Ethics in the Scientific 
Age, in TOWARDS A TRANSFORMATION OF PHILOSOPHY ch. 7, 225 (Glynn Adey & David 
Frisly trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1980) (1972). 
 82 Its fullest exposition can be found in JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Discourse Ethics: Notes on 
a Program of Philosophical Justification, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 43–115 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholson trans., 
MIT Press 1990). 
 83 See ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: THE THEORY OF 
RATIONAL DISCOURSE AS THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 177–208 (Ruth Adler & Neil 
MacCormick trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1989). 
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My argument will proceed in three parts.  In part one, I shall 
analyze and explain why and how intellectual works can be 
conceived of as complex speech acts.  In part two, the results of 
that analysis are used to morally reconstruct two aspects of 
copyright.  On the one hand, the right of attribution of authorship 
will be justified by the pattern of incorrect speech act.  On the 
other hand, the moral justification of exploitation rights is derived 
from the nature of language as such.  The final part will evaluate 
the alternative argument sketched. 
A. Intellectual Works as Complex Speech Acts 
 I contend that intellectual works need to be conceived of as 
complex speech acts.  For this purpose I will explain three different 
theses by which the claim above and its content can be further 
developed and completed.  The first thesis (a) concerns the 
qualification of intellectual works as speech acts in general.  I will 
show in what respect intellectual works are to be qualified as 
institutional facts.  Both the second (b) and the third (c) theses rest 
on the premise that the speech act designated as an intellectual 
work is a complex illocutionary act in the form (F1(p1) & F2(p2)).  
The first speech act F1(p1) I will refer to as attributing act, the 
second F2(p2) I will refer to as attributed act.84  This distinction 
must be clarified in two ways.  First, this distinction is merely 
analytical so that in fact either act mutually affects and depends 
upon the other.  Second, the attributed act, as it might be 
misunderstood, does not necessarily comprise a single action.  In 
fact, the act usually consists of several actions so that it is likely to 
be a complex illocutionary act.  Methodologically, these three 
theses rest on the outcome of an ordinary language 
phenomenology; I will attempt to reconstruct exactly those rules 
with which a speech act corresponds where it produces a symbol 
seen as an intellectual work. 
 
 84 That act might be termed as attributing object in order to retain the common object 
ontology.  But then it is overlooked that linguistically not an object—here the sign—but 
ultimately a human action behind that sign plays the decisive role. 
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1. Intellectual Works as Institutional Facts 
I will use the speech act theory to reconstruct the action which 
produces the speech act that is being designated and conceived of 
as an intellectual work.  In so doing the linguistic rules which 
allow intellectual works to serve as speech acts can be isolated and 
defined.  This kind of interpretation presupposes, however, that 
intellectual works are to be conceived of as speech acts.  This can 
be demonstrated by introducing the distinction between brute and 
institutional facts as developed and elaborated by Searle.85  While 
brute facts describe physically existing entities, institutional facts 
comprise those things which exist solely in and by human 
language.  Intellectual works are a good example of the latter.  This 
can be illustrated by considering the physical aspect of a painting 
or book.86  Such tangible goods do not differ from other man-made 
objects such as chairs or screwdrivers.  In both cases we are 
concerned with physically existing entities that can be labeled as 
brute facts.  Unless they are destroyed these entities would endure 
even if human beings ceased to exist.  Of course that does not 
mean that brute facts are entirely independent from human 
language.87  A chair, for instance, is designated a “chair” merely 
because the word “chair” symbolizes that entity.  The symbolized 
entity itself, however, is not a linguistic phenomenon.  Its physical 
characteristics exist independently from being symbolized by a 
sign.88  Similarly, a painting or a book would not lose its physical 
characteristics in a world without language; canvas and oil paint or 
ink and sheets of paper would continue to exist. 
If a painting or book is qualified as an “intellectual work,” it is 
plain that physical characteristics are not being referred to.  The 
term “intellectual work” does not simply symbolize oil on canvas 
 
 85 The distinction between institutional and brute facts can be found in SEARLE, SPEECH 
ACTS, supra note 80, at 50–53; JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 
27–29 (The Free Press 1995) [hereinafter SEARLE, SOCIAL REALITY]. 
 86 Of course, the following argumentation does not merely apply to paintings or books 
but applies also to all objects that may theoretically be interpreted as intellectual works 
(e.g., films, music, sculptures, dances, etc.). 
 87 SEARLE, SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 85, at 2 (“Of course, in order to state a brute 
fact we require the institution of language, but the fact stated needs to be distinguished 
from the statement of it.”) (emphasis in original). 
 88 See, e.g., id. at 27. 
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or sheets of paper with ink in the way that the terms “painting” and 
“book” do.  But what, then, is symbolized by an “intellectual 
work”?  There is only one answer: If a painting or a book is 
designated as an intellectual work then it has to be something 
beyond itself.  Thus, the notion of “intellectual work” does not 
represent physical characteristics, e.g., of paintings or books, but 
part of the meaning they symbolize.  Such an interpretation, 
however, hinges upon a rule attributing to certain physical entities 
a certain meaning.  Every symbol is based on constitutive rules89 
determining under what circumstances something is seen as 
something different.90  Consequently, there must be rules 
according to which a certain physical sign under certain 
circumstances is designated as an intellectual work.  Since such 
rules can merely exist linguistically91 the possibility of intellectual 
works as such depends upon human language.92 
2. Intellectual Works as Attributing Acts 
My second thesis deals with the first part of the complex 
illocutionary act, designated as intellectual work, namely F1(p1).  It 
says that “intellectual works” are evoked and generated exclusively 
by those speech acts, explicitly or implicitly entailing the assertion 
of authorship.  To put it another way: only those artificial symbols 
or signs which point to a human being as their author, i.e., 
containing an attribution, are designated as intellectual works.  
That means that the illocutionary role of F1 is an assertion whose 
propositional content p1 states that the speech act F2(p2) has one or 
several authors.  This part of the complex illocutionary act 
 
 89 See id. at 27–29 (discussing the concept of a constitutive rule and its difference to the 
regulative rule). 
 90 See id. at 43–46. 
 91 See id. at 59–66. 
 92 Since copyright refers to an institutional fact, Niel MacCormick, On the Very Idea of 
Intellectual Property: An Essay According to the Institutional Theory of Law, 3 INTELL. 
PROP. Q. 227, 234 (2002), has argued that the protection of copyright applies solely to 
itself.  In other words, copyright protects an artificial object that is created by copyright.  
Yet that would be true only if the constitutive rules intellectual works rest upon were 
generated by copyright alone.  That can be doubted: books, paintings etc. would remain 
intellectual works if they were not protected as intellectual works.  On the mutual 
interdependency between copyright and art see, e.g., Eberhard Ortland & Reinold 
Schmücker, Copyright & Art, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1762, 1768–69 (2005). 
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“intellectual work” I label as an attributing act.  Can we find a 
rationale for claiming that the speech act “intellectual work” 
necessarily entails such an attributing act? 
Stating the contrary would contradict our linguistic 
conventions.  For propositions like “that is an intellectual work 
without an author” or “there are intellectual works without 
authors” strike us in the same way as the proposition “that is an 
effect without cause” or “there are effects without causes” does.93  
The reason for that can be found in a conceptual contradiction: 
since the concepts of “author” and “work” as well as the concepts 
of “cause” and “effect” mutually affect and presuppose each other, 
neither of them can be affirmed or negated without the other.  They 
represent two related sides of what one is able to conceive of 
within the subsisting speech community only as a unity.94  
Intellectual works, as a matter of fact, always imply the question: 
who is the author?  At the same time, therefore, they imply the 
theoretical possibility of answering that question.95  If that question 
is negated with regard to a subject “intellectual work” then it is 
equally denied that that subject is an intellectual work. 
It is highly important to stress that the thesis above is a 
pragmatic one.  That is to say, my thesis refers to dispositive 
linguistic conventions.  It merely claims that the attribution of 
authorship is a linguistically necessary part of performing the 
speech act “intellectual work.”  It does not claim that this 
institutional fact constituted by the speech community is 
reasonable or makes any sense.  For this reason, any critique 
 
 93 To be sure, this does not apply if these assertions are taken to negate merely the 
present, not the theoretical existence of an author.  Such an interpretation intuitively 
removes the otherwise existing conceptual contradiction.  Again, it clearly confirms the 
conceptual contradiction involved. 
 94 With regard to the notion of cause/effect it is even possible to claim that it not only 
expresses a dispositive convention of speech community—like DAVID HUME, A 
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE: BEING AN ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE THE EXPERIMENTAL 
METHOD OF REASONING INTO MORAL SUBJECTS 400 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d. ed. 1975) 
(1740) did—but represents an a priori necessary concept. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE 
OF PURE REASON 218 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., Routledge and Keagan Paul 1963). 
 95 It seems to me that this aspect is also indicated by MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The Origin of 
the Work of Art, in BASIC WRITINGS FROM BEING AND TIME (1927) TO THE TASK OF 
THINKING (1964) 149 (David Farrell Krell ed., 1977) (“The artist is the origin of the 
work.  The work is the origin of the artist.  Neither is without the other.”). 
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calling into question the rationality of such an attribution does not 
affect my thesis.96  In addition, the attributing act is necessary but 
not sufficient to perform an intellectual work.  Someone can 
perform an attributing act without evoking an intellectual work, 
e.g., by putting his name onto an accidentally found root of a tree.  
In order for a speech act to imply the attributing act, the attributed 
act itself must fulfill certain requirements. Whether the attributing 
act fulfills its purpose, that is, whether it successfully performs the 
speech act “intellectual work,” depends after all on the speech act 
it attributes.  This aspect, however, concerns the second part of the 
complex speech act “intellectual work” which will be explained 
next. 
3. Intellectual Works as Attributed Acts 
My third thesis deals with the part of the speech act 
“intellectual work” to which I refer to as the attributed act F2(p2).  
This act provides the meaningful context within which the act of 
attributing can be performed in the first place.  In short: F2(p2) is 
the condition of its success.  It is complicated, however, to 
reconstruct the elements of that attributed act F2(p2): how must the 
speech act be shaped to automatically imply authorship and 
therefore create an intellectual work?  Every answer needs, first, 
the existence of a congruent linguistic convention, and second, it 
must be possible to discover that linguistic practice.  It may well be 
that—as is the case concerning the concept of art—no consistent 
linguistic rule deciding upon when a speech act is an intellectual 
work exists.  Even if such a convention existed, however, it would 
probably not be possible to discover.  A solution of this problem is 
impossible; but it is also not necessary.  This Article can restrict its 
reconstruction to elements which represent the core of intellectual 
works and can be linguistically explained. 
 
 96 See generally Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 
“Authorship”, 1999 DUKE L.J. 455 (1991) (presenting a typical critique by the 
poststructuralist movement). 
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a) Utterance Act and Propositional Content 
An analysis of the premises upon which the attributed act 
F2(p2) is built, should begin with analyzing its propositional 
content p2.  Both the utterance act and the propositional act 
performed by that speech act need to be examined.  The utterance 
act is that act generating a sound, sign or symbol.  On the other 
hand, the propositional act is the expression of a proposition, i.e., 
the composition of a meaningful sign.97  Whether a speech act 
represents an intellectual work surely depends upon these two 
factors.  Three examples help to illustrate this point of view: (i) A 
speaker asserts, “it will rain tomorrow”; (ii) a speaker makes that 
claim in form of poetry or music; and (iii) a speaker says, “ba be 
bi,” meaning that it will rain tomorrow.  All examples are based 
upon the possibility of being able to perform the same 
propositional act by different utterance acts.  Still, the question as 
to in what case the speech act performed can be considered an 
intellectual work might be answered differently.  Case (i) is likely 
to never be seen as an intellectual work.  In contrast, case (ii) may 
be interpreted as an intellectual work.  Case (iii) might not even be 
interpreted as a speech act.  The question arises as to why only 
case (ii) might be thought of as an intellectual work that implicitly 
causes the attributing act. 
My response to that question stems from the following 
assumption: as soon as the propositional act of the speaker partly 
transcends what generally had been or how it specifically had been 
previously symbolized, it is interpreted as “intellectual work.”  The 
concept of intellectual work includes those acts partly eluding the 
previous rules of the speech community and, at the same time, 
complying with those rules insofar as necessary to retain the 
possibility of being designated and interpreted as a speech act.  So 
the connectivity to the new linguistic rule is maintained implicitly 
open by the speaker’s explicit rule breach.  This feature may be 
termed as the rule-constituting rule breach.  That assumption helps 
to explain why there are certain speech acts whose comprehension 
needs a particular concept and that operate as contextual 
 
 97 This linguistic distinction is equivalent to the distinction between idea and 
expression in copyright. 
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background of the attributing act.  If by partially transcending the 
linguistically possible, a speech act does not accord with linguistic 
convention, then the intended proposition or utterance cannot be 
linguistically reproduced other than by connecting it with its 
communicator.  In the same way, the concept of intellectual work 
helps to comprehend what cannot yet adequately be reproduced 
linguistically.98 
The thesis that intellectual works are—linguistically 
speaking—rule-constituting rule breaches also explains the 
examples above.  In case (i) no rule breach can be recognized, 
while case (iii) is a rule breach but without any resemblance of 
rule.  Only, in case (ii) there is a breach of rules that is able to 
generate new rules, partly because of its accordance with previous 
rules.  This thesis can easily be integrated with considerations 
commonly held in art theory.  It corresponds to a popular view by 
Kant, which contends that art is existentially bound to genius.  
According to Kant, genius is “a talent for producing something for 
which no determinate rule can be given.”99  This is what Kant calls 
originality.  This does not mean that the genius lives and creates 
beyond any rule.  There is also original nonsense100—which can be 
defined as a rule-less rule breach.  The genuine or meaningful 
originality—which will always be capable of meaningful 
interpretation—must refer to the rules that enable it to be original 
in the first place.  For “directing the work to a purpose requires 
determinate rules that one is not permitted to renounce.”101  A 
work that is at once rule breaching and rule constituting has, 
according to Kant’s terminology, spirit.  It consists of expressing 
“what is ineffable in the mental state accompanying a certain 
presentation and to make it universally communicable—whether 
the expression consists in language or painting or plastic art.”102  
This requires uniting the ineffable “in a concept that can be 
 
 98 If the thesis of the rule-constituting rule breach was true, it could explain why the 
length of copyright is restricted.  For after a certain time it is possible to integrate the 
speech act of intellectual works linguistically. 
 99 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 175 (Werner S. Pluhar trans., Hackett 
Publ’g. Co. 1987) (1790). 
 100 Cf. id. at 175 (stating that “nonsense too can be original”). 
 101 Id. at 178. 
102  Id. at 186. 
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communicated without the constraint of rules (a concept that on 
that very account is original, while at the same time it reveals a 
new rule that could not have been inferred from any earlier 
principles or examples).”103  This sort of interpretation supports the 
paradigm of a rule-constituting rule breach according to which 
originality must not be conceived of as monological but 
dialogical.104 
b) The Illocutionary Act 
Compared with the preceding analysis, the determination of the 
illocutionary force F2 which the attributed act must meet in order 
to be designated as intellectual work is quite simple.  While this act 
cannot be restricted, as in the case of the attributing act, to a certain 
illocutionary force, its force can be systematized by means of a 
taxonomy of speech acts, as developed by Searle.  Searle 
differentiates five kinds of illocutionary acts, namely assertives, 
directives, commissives, expressives and declarations.105  
Assertives are those illocutionary acts expressing that some state is 
the case, such as assertions, claims, descriptions, confirmations, 
informing, etc.106  In other words, a proposition is purported to be 
true.  Directives aim at attempting to make someone take a certain 
action, such as pledging, commanding, requesting, recommending, 
etc.107  In the case of commissives the speaker commits himself to 
a certain behavior.  Good examples are a promise, a threat, a 
guarantee, an agreement, etc.108  Expressives are those speech acts 
with which a speaker tries to express a psychological state which 
points towards a propositional content.  To this apologizing, 
thanking, mourning, appreciating, etc. belong.109  Finally, 
 
 103 Id. 
 104 The advantage of a dialogical interpretation of originality is also emphasized by 
Friedman, supra note 64, at 179. 
 105 See Searle, A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts, in EXPRESSION AND MEANING. STUDIES 
IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS 1, 12–20 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1979); JOHN R. SEARLE 
& DANIEL VANDERVEKEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ILLOCUTIONARY LOGIC 52 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1985). 
 106 See, e.g., SEARLE & VANDERVEKEN, supra note 105, at 182–92. 
 107 See, e.g., id. at 198–205. 
 108 See, e.g., id. at 192–98. 
 109 See, e.g., id. at 211–16. 
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declarations represent those cases where the illocutionary act 
brings about a correspondence of reality with a propositional 
content, such as cursing, nominating, baptizing, etc.110 
All those categories can be derived from the possible relations 
between language and the world.  Every speech act necessarily 
relates its propositional content in a certain way to the world.  The 
way this relation occurs depends upon the direction of fit between 
the propositional content and the world.  There are four possible 
directions:111  First, it is possible that the propositional content 
aims at matching a status of the world (word-to-world-direction).  
This direction is employed by the assertives.  Secondly, the 
converse is possible, that is, the world is supposed to match the 
propositional content (world-to-word-direction).  That occurs in 
the case of directives and commissives.  Thirdly, both directions 
can be combined; then the world is supposed to match the 
propositional content by presenting it as having changed 
simultaneously (double-direction).  This happens in the case of 
declarations.  Fourthly, there is the possibility of no direction at all, 
when a direction is presupposed by an utterance (empty-direction).  
These are the expressives. 
Thus, the illocutionary force, F2 (being necessary for the 
occurrence of an intellectual work), depends upon the direction of 
fit between its propositional content and the world.  Like the 
reconstruction of the propositional content itself, however, it is not 
possible to fully determine which direction is linguistically 
presupposed concerning intellectual works.  At this point, it is 
therefore assumed that speech acts at least are considered 
intellectual works if their direction matches those of assertives and 
directives.112  This assumption not only rests upon the fact that it is 
quite common in the field of art theory to comprehend art as a 
description of reality—like the Platonic or Aristotelian view of 
mimesis—or as changing the world.  It rests equally upon the fact 
that the direction of commissives, expressives and declarations can 
 
 110 See, e.g., id. at 205–11. 
 111 See id. at 52–53. 
 112 That does not mean, to be sure, that a complex speech act seen as an intellectual 
work cannot perform other directions of fit as well.  Yet it does mean that this aspect is 
not constitutive for its being an intellectual work. 
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hardly be asserted as typical for intellectual works.  Rarely will 
someone believe that a speech act is an intellectual work because 
its speaker tries to commit himself to an action.  The same applies 
to declarations: a speech act is never deemed to be an intellectual 
work because it performs a baptism, etc.  Regarding expressives, 
the situation seems to be less plain.  Isn’t it a characteristic of 
intellectual works that they express approval or regret?  However, 
such a view is only plausible if those expressions are connected 
with a critical attitude.  In order to maintain the theoretical 
difference to directives, those expressions can only represent the 
uncritical utterance of regret or approval.  Anything else would 
lead to a world-to-word-direction which resulted in directives. 
B. The Linguistically Moral Reconstruction of Copyright 
So far I have outlined how intellectual works can be analyzed 
and defined by utilizing the speech act theory.  I have attempted to 
show how the institutional fact “intellectual work” can be grasped 
by means of ordinary language phenomenology.  I will now 
demonstrate how a different institutional fact, namely the 
copyright system, is morally justified.  First, the preceding 
linguistic analysis must be embedded into a moral argument with 
which the legal right concerning those speech acts can be made 
plausible.  In order to accomplish this, I shall employ two different 
strategies by which that objective can be pursued.113  On the one 
hand, it is generally possible to examine whether actions usually 
seen as infringements of copyright offend linguistic conventions.  
Such offences, then, can be proven morally wrong by applying the 
argumentative figure of defective speech act, normatively 
underpinned by Kantian universalism.  On the other hand, it is 
equally possible to focus not on the defects the speech act 
performed by a copyright infringer entails but on the linguistic 
necessity of those speech acts designated as “intellectual works.”  
 
 113 These strategies are not the only ones conceivable.  The fact, for example, that 
intellectual works are to be qualified as speech acts already entails moral implications,.for 
it enables us without difficulty to explain why animals or natural phenomena could never 
produce intellectual works.  A speech act is by its very concept an action performed by a 
member of our speech community according to its rules.  Those members are solely 
human beings. 
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By assuming an inherent telos of language promoted by 
intellectual works, copyright can be morally justified as long as it 
is considered a necessary condition for the creation and 
dissemination of those works.  The first strategy (a) will be 
demonstrated with regard to the right of attribution of authorship 
and bears centrally on the defects the act of plagiarism has 
according to speech act theory.  The second strategy (b) will be 
demonstrated with regard to exploitation rights.  Starting from a 
certain nature of language—reproduction and alteration of the 
world—it will be shown that this nature relies upon the existence 
of intellectual works. 
1. Justifying a Right of Attribution of Authorship: The Act of 
Plagiarism 
The following justification of the right of attribution of 
authorship consists of two argumentative parts.  In the first part 
(aa), the act of plagiarism will be linguistically reconstructed to 
illustrate the speech act performed by somebody who plagiarizes 
an intellectual work.  In the course of this analysis, it will be seen 
that the attributing act performed by a plagiarist must be qualified 
as a defective speech act in two ways.  In a second part (bb), an 
argument is given which lends moral weight to these linguistic 
defects.  At this point, I will employ a certain interpretation of the 
categorical imperative as developed by Kant. 
a) The Linguistic Defectiveness of Plagiarism 
In order to demonstrate the value of my approach and illustrate 
the idea of a defective speech act, I will examine the act of 
plagiarism.  Usually a plagiarist is someone who intentionally 
portrays himself as the author of an intellectual work which he has 
not created.  Such behavior is widely considered unethical.  From 
the perspective of speech act theory, however, plagiarism is prima 
facie very similar to the speech act analyzed as an intellectual 
work.114  By claiming authorship of the speech act in question, 
plagiarism equally comprises two speech acts: the attributing and 
the attributed act.  How, then, can it be argued linguistically that it 
 
114  See supra Part III.I.A.(a). 
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is rational to consider the plagiarist as an immoral agent?  The 
answer can only be found by a subtle analysis of what the 
plagiarist’s claim of authorship must imply and express 
pragmatically in order to succeed.  What we need is a 
reconstruction of the act of plagiarism in terms of speech act 
theory.  In doing so it will become apparent that the attributing act 
F1(p1) is subject to certain conditions offended by the plagiarist. 
First, the performance of F1(p1) is subject to preparatory 
conditions originating in the propositional content p1 and the act of 
assertion F1.  The claim that the plagiarist is an author works if, 
and only if, there is a linguistic rule according to which someone 
can be deemed to be an author at all.  In other words, at the outset 
it is to be presupposed that authorship as an institutional fact does 
exist.  Without authorship there cannot be plagiarism and vice 
versa.  For that reason p1 is internally connected with the premise 
of authorship.  Hence, by claiming his authorship the plagiarist 
implicitly asserts that he who is the author is to be treated as 
author.115  But if F1(p1) always contrafactually presupposes that the 
author must be acknowledged, the plagiarist faces a serious 
dilemma.  On the one hand, his attributing act makes sense only 
when presupposing that the author obtains recognition as an 
author.  On the other hand, the plagiarist cannot hold that premise 
since he wants recognition as the true author even though he is not.  
Ultimately, this would result in the absurd claim “I am the author 
of that intellectual work but I deny the existence of authorship.”  
Not only is this speech act defective; it also is not successful.  A 
plagiarist thus will want to avoid that consequence by concealing 
the fact of his non-authorship.  As a result, he is bound to perform 
the assumptions of F1(p1) in a contrafactual rather than in a factual 
way.  In that case, it is true, that the speech act of plagiarist is 
defective but at least successful.  According to Austin we are 
merely confronted with an insincerity rendering a speech act 
“unhappy.”116 
In addition, there is still a second defect that can be found in 
such a case.  For the performance of F1(p1) is subject to certain 
 
 115 Authorship cannot mean recognizing someone who pretends to be author.  For the 
plagiarist implicitly claims to be recognized as author and not as plagiarist. 
 116 AUSTIN, supra note 79, at 39. 
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conditions of sincerity.  These conditions are not morally based but 
simply spring from the illocutionary force of the assertion F1.  
Every assertion necessarily expresses the speaker’s belief in the 
truth of the proposition he wants to assert.117  For it is plainly 
impossible to simultaneously perform an assertion and deny its 
truth, because the contradiction this entails would prevent such 
utterances from being understood and interpreted as an assertion at 
all.  Thus, if the speech act of assertion is to be performed 
successfully, the psychological state of sincerity inevitably must be 
expressed.  In the case of plagiarism, however, the plagiarist does 
not believe in the truth of his assertion.  Otherwise he would not be 
a plagiarist but at the most someone who performs unconsciously a 
defective attributing act.  In order to avoid the failure of his 
assertion, every plagiarist is bound to conceal that belief.  By 
performing F1(p1) instead, he will express a contrafactually 
psychological state he does not factually have.  As a result, his 
speech act certainly remains defective but at the same time is 
successful. 
b) The Moral Implications of Defective Speech Acts 
The speech act performed by a plagiarist is successful but 
defective for two reasons.  First, the speech act offends a 
preparatory condition by implying something which the plagiarist, 
by definition, cannot presuppose.  Second, the plagiarist breaches a 
condition of sincerity as he expresses a psychological state he 
cannot have as a plagiarist.  In order to use these aspects to claim 
that plagiarism is to be prohibited and a right of attribution is 
morally necessary, the moral relevance of those defects must be 
demonstrated.  But how is that possible?  One might be inclined to 
consult the figure of performative contradiction as it has become 
popular in discourse ethics.118  The label “performative 
 
 117 See SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS, supra note 80, at 64. 
 118 See Robert Alexy, Discourse Theory and Human Rights, 9 RATIO JURIS 209, 214 
(1996) (using that figure); HABERMAS, supra note 82, at 80–81, 89–109.  Using that 
figure, though, has been massively criticized. See, e.g., ARMIN ENGLÄNDER, DISKURS ALS 
RECHTSQUELLE? ZUR KRITIK DER DISKURSTHEORIE DES RECHTS 42–47 (Mohr Siebeck 
2002); PETER VON GRIL, DIE MÖGLICHKEIT PRAKTISCHER ERKENNTNIS AUS SICHT DER 
DISKURSTHEORIE. EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUR JÜRGEN HABERMAS UND ROBERT ALEXY 53–
56 (Duncker & Humbolt 1998).  However, the critique does only apply to its tautological 
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contradiction” refers to a contradiction between the content of an 
act and the necessary presuppositions of its performance.  The 
speech act, for example, “I claim authorship but I do not believe in 
my assertion” clearly is a pragmatic contradiction that leads to its 
failure.  For every assertion needs to express belief in its truth in 
order to be understood by others as an assertion.119  However, this 
argument does not take us very far.  First, the moral relevance of 
its reasoning can be questioned: if the contradiction itself already 
results in the speech act being not only defective but fails as well, 
it is absurd to prohibit its success.  Second, the speech act of 
plagiarism does not represent a performative contradiction, that is, 
a contradiction in performing an action.  Since that speech act 
perfectly implies and expresses its necessary conditions it is 
externally consistent and therefore successful. 
Thus, the contradiction entailed by plagiarism points at a 
different dimension, at the dimension of will.  By performing the 
speech act of plagiarism the plagiarist shows that he accepts the 
preparatory conditions and conditions of sincerity upon which his 
practice linguistically relies.120  This is exactly the reason why he 
fakes their existence.  So he clearly knows that the performance of 
his speech act necessitates two things.  First, it necessitates the 
existence of the institution of authorship without which the 
asserted propositional content p1 would not make any sense.  
Second, it necessitates the belief in the sincerity of the content 
without which the assertion F1 would not be possible.  To 
guarantee the success of his speech act, therefore, the plagiarist 
must will both the institution of authorship, as well as the belief in 
its sincerity, to exist.  Yet the plagiarist cannot intend for his 
speech act to become a common practice because he would no 
longer be able to perform it.  The impossibility of wanting the 
action as a general rule without causing its impossibility represents 
the inherent contradiction of plagiarism.  This contradiction 
 
use as a means of justifying rules on whose basis a performative contradiction rests.  It 
does not apply insofar as those rules are already given.  In such a case, even critics admit 
that a performative contradiction is a compelling argument. See, e.g., ERNST TUGENDHAT, 
VORLESUNGEN ÜBER ETHIK 166–68 (Surhkamp 1993). 
 119 See SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS, supra note 80, at 64–65. 
 120 Id. at 62 (analyzing argumentation of insincere promises). 
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consequently leads to the accusation of a necessary inconsistency 
that is implied by his conduct and makes it morally wrong. 
The stated argument, ultimately, is a Kantian one.  It illustrates 
that version of the categorical imperative according to which one 
ought to act on a maxim which one can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law.121  Hence, my argument rests on a 
compelling principle, namely the principle of universalization or 
impartiality respectively.  That principle is a minimum requirement 
on all moral judgments.122  Every action will be generally agreed 
upon only if that action can also be generally realized.  So the 
proposed argument also proves that the categorical imperative is 
not a completely meaningless principle as critics often claim.123  Its 
weakness merely lies in the fact that it only works as long as 
linguistic rules exist enabling both the institution of authorship and 
the speech act of assertion.  For “a contradiction,” as Hegel argued, 
“must be a contradiction of something, i.e., of some content 
presupposed from the start as a fixed principle.”124  Admittedly, the 
argument I present is not able to provide grounds for such a fixed 
principle.  More precisely, it is not able to establish those linguistic 
rules which the act of plagiarism contradicts.  As a result, the 
possibility of its application relies upon contingently linguistic 
rules whose subsistence it cannot ensure.  Still, this does not point 
to any defect with my rationale.  For in any event, the speech act of 
plagiarism cannot be performed successfully unless those linguistic 
rules allowing meeting its necessary conditions do already exist.  
Once again, without authorship there is no plagiarism.  Hence, 
inasmuch as that speech act can come into existence, it can also be 
discredited as being immoral.  From that it follows that the right of 
attribution of authorship is morally necessary.125 
 
 121 See KANT, supra note 21, 31–32.  On this formula, see Christine M. Korsgaard, 
Kant’s Formula of Universal Law, in CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 77 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1996). 
 122 J. L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 83 (Pelican Books 1977) (“This 
principle, in some sense, is beyond dispute.”). 
 123 See HEGEL, supra note 43, para. 135, for a classical critique. 
 124 Id. 
 125 That applies only insofar as the institution of authorship does exist.  Otherwise, the 
question for rights of the author could not be put forward. 
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2. Justifying Exploitation Rights: The Telos of Language 
Justifying exploitation rights by means of speech act theory is 
much more complicated.  Since the exploitation of an intellectual 
work does not affect its attributing and attributed act, such a 
justification cannot be undertaken by simply proving it 
linguistically defective.  For this reason, I shall suggest a different 
argument.  I will attempt to explain that those speech acts 
designated as intellectual works are linguistically necessary.  
Assuming also that exploitation rights are required for facilitating 
the factual performance of those speech acts, these rights are 
therefore morally necessary.  In what follows this argument will be 
further elaborated.  As a first step in section (a), the idea behind it 
will be given a shape in a four-stage argument.  Subsequently  in 
section (b), two problems with that argument will be discussed. 
a) The Structure of a Teleological Argument 
How can it linguistically be shown that exploitation rights are 
morally reasonable?  My answer consists of a four-stage argument: 
(i) The first stage focuses on the attributed act and the 
characteristics of its propositional content.  As discussed 
previously intellectual works can be conceived of as rule-
constituting rule breaches.  They form speech acts that enhance 
and expand the possibility of what can be linguistically expressed.  
Intellectual works consequently result in an increase of linguistic 
possibilities.  (ii) The second stage has two aspects, both of which 
emphasize the necessity of such an increase.  First, a certain nature 
or telos of language is presupposed.  That is to say, human 
language aims at reproducing or altering the concept of world.  
Second, the concept of world is not static but dynamic.  As the 
world permanently changes, new perspectives and interpretations 
(both of descriptive and normative kind) emerge.  In order to 
integrate them linguistically, language must differentiate further.  
(iii) At the third stage two premises are asserted.  First, the 
performance of those speech acts designated as intellectual works 
does not result from nature but, rather, requires incentives.  
Second, these incentives can only be given by exploitation rights.  
(iv) The fourth stage consists of the conclusion that exploitation 
rights are morally necessary. 
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b) Defending its Assumptions 
Since the first stage of the argument has been developed in the 
course of section III.A.  I will focus on stages (B) and (C).  The 
second stage introduces the thesis that the nature or telos of 
language involves reproducing and altering the world.  Does that 
thesis make any sense?  The assertion that there is an inherent telos 
in language is not new.  In fact, it is found in the work of 
Habermas, though in a somewhat different way.  He holds 
language as a place of rationality; according to him language 
embodies the telos of understanding.126  Such a normative thesis 
can easily be criticized, e.g., by observing that language is also 
used to produce dissent.127  In this Article the notion of “telos” 
shall mean something different.  It does not deal with the objective 
language ought to pursue but with the objective language is 
necessarily directed towards.  This interpretation is supported by 
Searle’s argument regarding the world-direction of language.  
Language can be directed at the world or the world can be directed 
at language.128  The former refers to reproducing the world, the 
latter points at an alteration of the world.  Thus, it is reasonable to 
assume that at least one purpose language has can be found in its 
effects.  It can be said, then, that the telos of language also 
comprises the reproduction and alteration of the world.  Due to the 
permanent alteration of the world, however, its linguistic 
interpretation and description must alter as well. 
Difficulties with my argument can be found at its third stage.  
They are identical to those problems arising from the so-called 
incentive function of copyright.  Particularly, the argument 
 
 126 See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, The Theory of Communicative Action, 1 REASON AND 
THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 287 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984) 
(1981) (“Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech.”); JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF 
LAW AND DEMOCRACY 4 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996). 
 127 For a critique, see Niklas Luhmann, Was ist Kommunikation?, in AUFSÄTZE UND 
REDEN 103 (Oliver Jahraus ed., 2001) (“One can also communicate in order to mark a 
dissent, and there is no compelling ground upon which the search for consent should be 
considered more rational than the search for dissent.”) (author’s translation). 
 128 To be sure, both directions can be combined.  Since the analysis of the speech act 
intellectual works perform examined only these directions, I confine myself to discuss 
only these. 
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assumes that those linguistically expanding and enhancing speech 
acts called intellectual works do need an incentive in the first 
place; in terms of the efficiency-based model, that premise is 
identical to assuming a market failure concerning intellectual 
works.  In addition, the required incentive can only be obtained by 
creating exploitation rights concerning those works.  Thus, these 
rights are merely servants of a linguistic necessity.  Of course, the 
plausibility of my argument does depend on the empirical validity 
of the incentive function thesis, which in any event cannot be 
proven empirically.  But is the given argument, then, equally 
defective?  Not at all.  Unlike the Efficiency-based and Culture-
based justification my argument does not argue collectivistically 
by referring to social needs but it does relocate those problems at 
the place intellectual works emanate from, i.e., human language. 
C. Evaluation of the Alternative Model 
Several objections to the linguistic reasoning for a right of 
attribution of authorship and for exploitation rights are 
conceivable.  It is possible, for example, that the normative basis of 
the alternative model sketched might be criticized.  For it is true 
that the claim that from linguistic defects and necessities normative 
rules can be inferred, cannot itself be justified by linguistic rules.  
Thus, the model ultimately infers norms from facts, at least 
psychologically.  Yet that defect is inherent in any normative 
argument and therefore is shared by the other justification models.  
All justification models must begin with an unproven premise 
upon which their argument rests.  So that objection is not specific 
to my argument but concerns the ability to justify moral norms in 
general.  Since the justifiability of moral norms must be assumed 
in order to be able to discuss the morality of copyright at all, that 
objection has a fatal connotation.  In discourses about the moral 
justification of copyright, the explicit negation of the truth ability 
of normative statements results in a performative contradiction.  
This is so because this negation explicitly denies what the assertion 
“copyright is justified or not justified” implicitly presupposes.  
This Article would face the same problem if it denied the truth 
ability of normative statements but, at the same time, discussed 
arguments for and against the justification of copyright.  So the 
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language game or practice with which participants engage when 
addressing the morality of copyright inevitably assumes that moral 
norms are theoretically justifiable.129 
However, the aforementioned objection makes us think about 
another possible criticism: What is the advantage of the alternative 
model if it has the same (theoretical) weaknesses as the others?  
The universalistic-transcendental model sketched in this Article 
represents a progress in two respects.  First, it avoids a normative 
deficiency embodied in the other models, and second, it is more 
specific than those models.  A normative deficiency is sorted out 
by overcoming the fierce conflict between individualistic and 
collectivistic models.  In contrast, the alternative model goes back 
to the initial link between either position, namely their coexistence 
in the speech community.  So a right of attribution of authorship is 
no longer justified by claiming a moral relation either between 
author/work or society/work; it is justified because in either 
relation the speech act of plagiarism is equally defective according 
to conventional linguistic rules.  Similarly, exploitation rights are 
necessary due to the function of language which is in either 
relation necessarily identical.130  Moreover, my model is more 
specific as it takes into account the ontology of intellectual works 
in a more appropriate way.  Not only does it argumentatively 
integrate the ontology of intellectual works like Work-based and 
Culture-based models, it also considers human language as the 
central argument for a moral justification of copyright at all. 
 
 129 It needs to be emphasized, however, that this is the only function of that assumption; 
in particular, it does not mean that moral norms are objectively justifiable. 
 130 One might ask whether there is any difference to the collectivistic justification.  For 
it could seem that, by referring to human language, my approach is ultimately subject to 
societal interests.  In other words: Does not language itself always concern the interest of 
any society?  Yet this “interest” differs significantly from those interests underlying 
collectivistic justifications.  First, language is the means by which we—authors and 
society —give expression to our interests.  Thus, it is the prior condition for our ability to 
express the interests forming the basis for collectivistic justifications.  Secondly, the 
function of language lies not at our disposal but is rather the evolutionary product of 
unintended events. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Why is copyright morally justified?  This question is normally 
answered in two opposing ways.  In the European-Continental 
context it is mostly held that a specific relation between authors 
and their intellectual works exists giving copyright as a legal 
institution moral relevance.  In this way, copyright is based upon a 
moral right of the author which bestows upon him an entitlement 
to his intellectual works.  This kind of justification which can be 
designated as individualistic is opposed by a perspective 
dominating the Anglo-American area.  It holds that the moral 
justification of copyright results from a specific relation between 
society and intellectual works.  Thus, copyright is morally 
grounded in a way which can be referred to as collectivistic.  The 
crucial difference between these standpoints can be put in another 
way: According to the individualistic perspective, the author’s 
legal right—that is the copyright—is also his moral right.  Hence 
the moral and legal relations coincide.  By contrast, the 
collectivistic perspective takes copyright solely as the author’s 
legal, not as his moral right.  So the moral and legal relation part 
company with one another.  To be sure, the difference as 
formulated above does not overlook that intellectual works concern 
interests of both society and authors.  It decides, however, upon the 
ultimate moral justification of copyright, i.e., which relation 
prevails in case of conflict.  In such a situation, any attempt to 
settle the issue by balancing or compromising the interests 
involved is bound to fail.  Because of what I have called the 
problem of irreconcilability, in the light of those models a decision 
between author and society is inevitable. 
One possible solution is the alternative model which I have 
sketched in this Article.  This approach can be conceived of as an 
universalistic-transcendental justification.  It is universalistic 
because it is neither individualistic nor collectivistic but originates 
from a level prior to that difference.  It is transcendental because 
that prior level is found in the ultimate precondition enabling those 
relations, i.e., the condition of the possibility of either relation.  
This condition is the human language.  Starting with this premise, 
it is possible to demonstrate that intellectual works are to be 
construed as speech acts.  This finding, in turn, can be used to 
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morally reconstruct certain features of copyright.  On the one hand, 
the right of attribution of authorship can be justified by elucidating 
the linguistic defects attached to the act of plagiarism.  On the 
other hand, the moral justification of economic rights derives from 
the nature of language as such, for this nature relies upon the 
existence of intellectual works.  The outlined argument advances 
common perspectives on copyright law in two ways.  
Ontologically, the traditional way in copyright law of thinking of 
intangible objects is abandoned in favor of thinking of 
communicative actions.  Intellectual works should no longer be 
seen as objects but as the meaning of speech acts performed by 
authors.  Morally, the argument overcomes the thinking of 
individualistic and collectivistic relations in favor of thinking of 
linguistic conventions.  Thus, copyright should not be derived from 
moral rights of authors or of society but from human language as 
their common form of being.  If the proposed ontological and 
moral paradigm shift were encouraged by this Article, if the 
traditional thinking were abandoned in favor of thinking of 
communicative actions and its rules, much would be achieved. 
 
